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Abstract
We introduce a new adaptive clipping technique for training learning models with user-level
differential privacy that removes the need for extensive parameter tuning. Previous approaches
to this problem use the Federated Stochastic Gradient Descent or the Federated Averaging al-
gorithm with noised updates, and compute a differential privacy guarantee using the Moments
Accountant. These approaches rely on choosing a norm bound for each user’s update to the
model, which needs to be tuned carefully. The best value depends on the learning rate, model
architecture, number of passes made over each user’s data, and possibly various other param-
eters. We show that adaptively setting the clipping norm applied to each user’s update, based
on a differentially private estimate of a target quantile of the distribution of unclipped norms,
is sufficient to remove the need for such extensive parameter tuning.
1 Introduction
There have been a lot of recent advances in iterative training methods like stochastic gradient
descent (SGD), one of the main reasons being thier applicability in training neural networks. Deep
learning has found a variety of applications, including image classification, language translation,
and music generation [25, 12, 26, 4]. To effectively perform such tasks, neural networks need a
large amount of data for training. It is often the case that these datasets contain a lot of sensitive
information. Moreover, many recent works [10, 27, 24, 5, 20] have shown that it is possible to
extract sensitive information about the training data just from the parameters of a trained model.
Thus, it becomes imperative to use learning techniques that provide a rigorous guarantee of privacy
for the training data used.
Differential privacy (DP) [8, 9] has been recently used as a gold standard to bound the privacy
leakage of sensitive data when performing learning tasks. Intuitively, DP prevents an adversary
from confidently making any conclusions about whether a sample was used in training a model,
even while having access to arbitrary side information. To formally establish the notion of DP, we
first define neighboring datasets. We will refer to a pair of datasets D,D′ ∈ D as neighbors if D′
can be obtained from D by adding or removing one element.
Definition 1.1 (Differential Privacy [8, 9]). A (randomized) algorithm M : D → R with input
domain D and output range R is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all pairs of neighboring datasets
D,D′ ∈ D, and every measurable S ⊆ R, we have with probability over the coin flips of M that:
Pr (M(D) ∈ S) ≤ eε · Pr (M(D′) ∈ S)+ δ.
∗Work performed while at Google.
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Federated Learning [17] is a decentralized approach in which the training data is left distributed
on user devices, and training is done via aggregating updates that have been computed locally.
Federated Averaging [17] is a technique that combines local SGD on each user’s data with a server
that performs model averaging. Learning language models involves fairly complex networks like
long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural networks (RNNs), and the training data can
involve personalized sensitive information such as passwords and text conversations. Hence, we use
learning language models for next-word-prediction as a motivating task, and use this as a running
example.
In this paper, we will consider two settings of privacy: example-level, and user-level. When
we use Federated SGD, we preserve example-level DP (also in [7, 3, 2, 21, 28, 22, 13]) where each
element is a single training example. On the other hand, when we use Federated Averaging, we
preserve the stronger guarantee of user-level DP (also in [19]), where an element refers to the
complete data held by a user.
While there has been a lot of work in the designing of DP techniques for learning, almost every
technique has some hyperparameters which need to be set appropriately for obtaining a good utility.
It is often unclear apriori how to set the values of different hyperparameters introduced via the
addition of privacy, for example, the clipping threshold for gradient updates in DP SGD. Moreover,
learning techniques have their own hyperparameters which might need to be set differently when
training is performed with privacy. For example, the learning rate in DP SGD might need to be
set to a high value if the clipping threshold is very low, and vice-versa. Such tuning for large
networks can have an exhorbitant cost in computation and efficiency, which can be a bottleneck
for real-world systems that involve communicating with millions of samples for training a single
network. Tuning also incurs an additional cost for privacy, which needs to be accounted for when
providing a privacy guarantee for the released model with tuned hyperparameters.
1.1 Related Work
DP SGD has been the focus of many recent works [7, 3, 2, 28]. Privacy amplification via subsampling
was introduced in [14]. The moments accountant, which tightly bounds the privacy loss of the
Guassian mechanism when used with amplification via subsampling, was introduced by Abadi
et al. [1]. It was further extended in [18] to incorporate estimating heterogeneous sets of vectors
from batches of subsamples. The technique of Federated Averaging was introduced in [17], and was
subsequently used in [19] to effectively train recurrent language models. This work builds upon
[19].
Several works have studied the problem of privacy-preserving hyperparameter tuning. An ap-
proach based on target accuracy was provided in [11], which was further improved in terms of
privacy cost and computational efficiency in [16]. A method based on data splitting was provided
in [7], whereas one based on satisfying certain stability conditions was introduced in [6]. We would
like to note that all the prior works focused on the general problem of parameter search, whereas
the focus of this work is to adaptively adjust the value of a parameter in iterative procedures to
eliminate the need for extensive tuning.
1.2 Motivation
Bounding the influence of any sample in a learning process is both desirable and necessary. If left
unbounded, any sample can potentially sway the learned system to overfit to its data, defeating the
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purpose of trying to learn actual trends in the population. One way to bound the contribution of an
example in any phase of the learning process is to bound the total L2 norm of its gradient update.
Let the bound be denoted by C. This implies that if the L2 norm of any example’s update is greater
than C, then it gets ‘clipped’ to have a norm of C before being sent to the server. Such clipping
also effectively bounds the sensitivity of the system with respect to the addition or removal of any
example from the training set. As a result, adding appropriate noise post clipping is sufficient for
achieving a differential privacy guarantee for the system. [7, 3, 2]
Setting an appropriate value for the clipping threshold C can be crucial for the utility of a
differentially private learned system, as setting it too low can result in high information loss,
whereas setting it too high can result in the addition of a lot of noise. Both the cases can decrease
the signal-to-noise ratio for the learning process, which can adversely affect the utility of the
learned system. Such behavior can be observed in prior work [19] which shows the performance of
a differentially private language model learned over various values of C.
Learning large models using the Federated Averaging/SGD algorithm [17, 19] can take thou-
sands of rounds of interaction between the central server and the clients. The norms of the updates
can vary as the rounds progress. As a result, even setting a constant clipping threshold through-
out the learning process can result in decreased utility of the system. Prior work [19] has shown
that decreasing the value of the clipping threshold after training a language model for some initial
number of rounds actually results in increased accuracy of the system. However, the behavior of
the norms can be difficult to predict without prior knowledge about the system, and it might be
inefficient to conduct experiments to learn such behavior.
Since each layer of a learning system can provide a different functionality, it can be useful in
some situations to clip the updates layer-wise (i.e., per-layer clipping [19]). However, as shown in
Figure 1, the norms of the individual layers can be of different magnitudes, thus making it even
more difficult to efficiently search the space of clipping parameters. As a result, there is a need for
a system which learns this ‘on-the-fly’ to get high utility while ensuring privacy.
Figure 1: Layers in an LSTM next-word prediction model, together with the mean L2 norm
of the per-layer client updates, after 500 rounds of Federated Averaging. The largest num-
ber of parameters are found in the word embedding matrix shared by the input and output,
embedding lookup/params.
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2 Differentially Private Adaptive Quantile Clipping
In this section, we will describe the adaptive strategy that can be used for adjusting the clipping
threshold according to the norms of the updates. First, we will describe the adaptive quantile
clipping strategy, which is designed for iterative differentially private mechanisms. Next, we will
describe layer-specific noise addition strategies for getting a higher utility than the basic strategy
of adding noise with the same scale to each layer.
2.1 Loss Functions for Estimating Quantiles
Let X ∈ R be a random variable, let γ ∈ [0, 1] be a quantile to be matched. For any C, define
`γ(C,X) =
{
(1− γ)(C −X) if X ≤ C,
γ(X − C) o.w. which implies ∇`γ(C,X) =
{
(1− γ) if X ≤ C,
−γ o.w.
Hence, E[∇`γ(C,X)] = (1− γ) · Pr[X ≤ C]− γ · Pr[X > C] = Pr[X ≤ C]− γ.
For C∗ such that E[∇`γ(C∗, X)] = 0 , we have Pr(X ≤ C∗) = γ. Therefore, C∗ is at the γth
quantile of X [15]. Because the loss is convex and has gradients bounded by 1, we can produce an
online estimate of C that converges to the γth quantile of X using online gradient descent (see, e.g.,
Shalev-Shwartz [23]). Since the loss is convex but not strongly convex, a learning rate proportional
to 1/
√
t will produce a sublinear regret bound. See Figure 2 for a plot of the loss function for a
discrete random variable that takes six values with equal probability.
Suppose at some round we have n samples of X, with values (x1, . . . , xn). The average derivative
of the loss for that round is
∇Lγ(C,X) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
{
(1− γ) if xi ≤ C
−γ o.w.
=
1
n
(1− γ) ∑
i∈[n]
Ixi≤C − γ
∑
i∈[n]
Ixi>C
 = β − γ,
where β ≡ 1n
∑
i∈[n] Ixi≤C is the empirical fraction of samples with value at most C. For a given
learning rate η, we can perform the linear update: C ← C − η(β − γ).
Geometric updates. Since β and γ take values in the range [0, 1], the linear update rule de-
scribed above changes C by a maximum of η at each step. This can be slow if C is on the wrong
order of magnitude. At the other extreme, if the optimal value of C is orders of magnitude smaller
than η, the update can be very coarse, and may often overshoot to become negative. To remedy
such issues, we propose the following geometric update rule: C ← C · exp(−η(β − γ)).
2.2 Adaptive Quantile Clipping
Let r be the number of layers, n be the expected number of users sampled per iteration, and γ denote
the target fraction of users without clipped updates. As in [19], we consider two kinds of clipping:
i) flat clipping, where we have an overall clipping parameter C and we clip the concatenation of
all layers, and ii) per-layer clipping, where we are given a per-layer clipping parameter Cj for each
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Figure 2: Loss functions to estimate the 0th, 50th, 75th, and 100th quantiles for a random variable
that uniformly takes values in {15, 25, 28, 40, 45, 48}. The loss function is the average of convex
piecewise-linear functions, one for each value. For instance, for the median (γ = 0.5), this is just
`γ(C,X) =
1
2 |X − C|, where X is the random value, and C is the estimate. When we average
these functions, we arrive at the blue function in the plot showing the average loss, which indeed is
minimized by any value between the middle two elements, i.e., in the interval [28, 40]. The function
for γ = 0.75 is minimized at C = 45 because for values in [40, 45), the quantile is less than γ while
for values in [45, 48) the quantile is greater than γ.
layer j ∈ [r] and each layer is clipped separately. If performing per-layer clipping, set m = r,
otherwise set m = 1. For each j ∈ [m] and iteration t ∈ [T ], let Ctj be the clipping threshold, and
ηtj be the learning rate for learning C
t+1
j . We start with some value of C
0
j . Let N be the random
variable that denotes the number of users sampled in round t. Each user i ∈ [N ] will send m bits
bti = (b
t
i,1, . . . , b
t
i,m) along with the usual update ∆
t
i = (∆
t
i,1, . . . ,∆
t
i,m), where bit b
t
i,j = I||∆ti,j ||2≤Ctj ,
for j ∈ [m].
We define the loss for user i for the update to the jth layer in the tth round as
`γ(C
t
j ,∆
t
i,j) =
{
(1− γ)(Ctj − ||∆ti,j ||2) if ||∆ti,j ||2 ≤ Ctj
γ(||∆ti,j ||2 − Ctj) otherwise
.
Then define L(Ctj) =
1
n
N∑
i=1
`(Ctj ,∆
t
i,j), and β
t
j =
1
n
N∑
i=1
bti,j for the j
th layer in the tth round. As
E[N ] = n, βtj is an unbiased estimate of the fraction of unclipped updates for the jth layer in the
tth round. Thus, we have ∇L(Ctj) = (1 − γ)βtj − γ(1 − βtj) = βtj − γ. Observe that if βtj = γ,
then ∇L(Ctj) = 0. Note that the server only requires βtj to compute the gradient ∇L(Ctj), which is
computed privately along with the average of the updates from the users. Moreover, the magnitude
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of the gradient depends on how far βtj is from the target unclipped percentage γ. We update
the clipping threshold for the next round as Ct+1j = C
t
j − ηtj∇L(Ctj) for a linear update, and
Ct+1j = C
t
j · exp (−ηtj∇L(Ctj)) for a geometric update. We also define a parameter c ∈ [0, 1]
denoting the proportion of the per-iteration privacy budget (details in [18]) that is used for the
computation of the clipped counts described above. The rest of the budget is used for computing
an average of the user updates. We provide a pseudocode of the complete algorithm in Algorithm 1.
Such a strategy can also be useful for getting an idea about the range of the norms of the
updates, by setting γ very close to 0 (1) to find the minimum (maximum). This can help in getting
a ballpark idea about the magnitudes of the individual layers without any prior knowledge, which
can then be utilized for setting the initial clipping threshold C0j ,∀j ∈ [m] appropriately.
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Learning with Adaptive Clipping
function Train(Parameters- user selection
probability q ∈ (0, 1], target unclipped quan-
tile γ ∈ [0, 1], clipping counts budget propor-
tion c ∈ [0, 1), noise scale z ∈ R+, ClipUp-
date (Lin or Geom), UsrUpdate (for FedAvg
or FedSGD), ClipFn (FlatClip or PerLayer-
Clip))
Initialize model θ0, clipping bound(s) C0,
moments accountant M
for each round t = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
Qt ← (sample users with probability q)
for each user k ∈ Qt in parallel do
(∆tk, b
t
k)← UsrUpdate(k, θt,ClipFn, Ct)
∆t =
∑
k∈Ct ∆
t
k
qn , β
t =
∑
k∈Ct b
t
k
qn
St ← (bound on ||∆tk|| for ClipFn)
σ∆t ← zStqW ·
√
1
1−c , σβt ← zqn ·
√
1
c
θt+1 ← θt + ∆t +N (0, Iσ2∆t)
Ct+1 ← ClipUpdate(Ct, βt +N (0, Iσ2βt))
M.accum priv spending(z)
function LinUpdate(Input- Current value(s)
C, current unclipped quantile(s) β;
Parameters- γ, η)
return C − η(β − γ)
function GeomUpdate(Input- Current
value(s) C, current unclipped quantile(s) β;
Parameters- γ, η)
return C · exp (−η(β − γ))
function UsrUpdateFedAvg(Input- k, θ0,
ClipFn, Clipping bound(s) C; Parameters-
G,E, η)
θ ← θ0
for each local epoch i ∈ [E] do
G ← (k’s local data split into size G
batches)
for batch g ∈ G do
θ ← θ − η∇`(θ; g)
return ClipFn(θ − θ0, C)
function UsrUpdateFedSGD(Input- k, θ0,
ClipFn, Clipping bound(s) C; Parameters-
G, η)
Select a batch g of size G from k’s examples
return (∆k, b) = ClipFn(−η∇`(θ; g), C)
function FlatClip(Input- Update ∆, Clip-
ping bound C)
S = C, b = I||∆||≤C , ∆′ = ∆ ·min
(
1, C||∆||
)
return (∆′, b)
function PerLayerClip(Input- Update ∆,
Clipping bounds C = (C(1), . . . , C(m)))
S =
√∑
j∈[m]C(j)2
for each layer j ∈ [m] do
b(j) = I||∆(j)||≤C(j)
∆′(j) = ∆(j) ·min
(
1, C(j)||∆(j)||
)
return (∆′, b′)
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